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Be plural as the universe. 
⎯ Fernando Pessoa 
 
Schizophrenia is usually described as a fragmentation of subjective experience and the impossibility 
to engage in meaningful cultural and intersubjective practices. Although the term schizophrenia is less 
than 100 years old, madness is generally believed to have accompanied mankind through its historical 
and cultural ontogeny. What does it mean to be “mad”? The failure to adopt social practices or to 
internalize cultural values of common sense? 
The nonspecific concept of madness has been around for many thousands of years and 
“schizophrenia” was only classified by Bleuler (1857-1939) in 1907. It is normally accepted that it 
was a renaming of the dementia praecox of Kraepelin (1859-1926), who already derived the term 
from previous authors (Morel (1809-1873), Pick (1851–1924) see Garrabé, 2003)). However, one 
should consider this theoretical concept with caution, since many psychiatry historians do not accept 
the idea that schizophrenia is an illness that has always existed and that has been progressively 
discovered. Berrios, Luque and Villagrán (2003) hold that the history of the concept of schizophrenia 
should not be described as a progressive continuity, for it only serves to justify the current concept. In 
the opinion of these authors, schizophrenia should be described not as a unitary disease but as a 
collection of symptoms, and its history as a set of different research programs running in parallel. 
With this in mind, we shall consider some important moments in the history of schizophrenia. 
According to Garrabé (2003), 1911 was an important year in the history of psychopathology because 
Bleuler published Dementia Praecox, or the Group of Schizophrenias, Freud published Psycho-
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Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (better 
known as “the case Schreber”) and Jung published Symbols of Transformation (also about 
schizophrenia?). Bleuler coined, as we mentioned, the term “schizophrenia”: 
 
I call dementia praecox schizophrenia because, as I hope to show, the splitting of the different 
psychic functions is one of its most important features. In each case, there is a more or less clear 
splitting of the psychological functions: as the disease becomes dis-tinct, the personality loses its 
unity (Bleuler (1911), cited in Ashok, Baugh and Yeragani, 2012, p.1).   
 
According to Bleuler, the schizophrenias were a nosological group of diseases that had a 
similar clinical evolution and expression. This group of diseases have in common the splitting 
(spaltung) of psychic functions in independent complexes and some affective and associative 
disorders. Bleuler considered that his theory of schizophrenia was an application of psychoanalytic 
ideas to Kraepelian’s dementia praecox. The primary symptom of loosening the association of ideas 
would have an organic origin but from there on a psychogenic explanation was required. In this 
psychogenic explanation, Bleuler used the concept of “primary process”, already proposed by Freud, 
to explain unconscious drives. He also used for the first time the concept of “autism” to describe 
schizophrenics who were isolated from external reality, and this concept is similar to psychoanalytic 
“self-erotism”. In turn, Jung, Bleuler’s assistant, developed a different conception of schizophrenia. 
He desexualized the Freudian concept of “libido” turning it into a form of energy that can be invested 
in reality. In the case of schizophrenia, this energy is withdrawn from reality, and the mind of the 
patient becomes dominated by the collective unconscious, filled by “imagos”, archaic universal 
structures of the human psychic. 
In that same year, Freud published an analysis of a book of memoirs of a patient that today is 
considered schizophrenic, the judge Schreber. His delusion is interpreted as a projection of 
unconscious homosexuality. Later, the book Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (1903), became subject 
to different interpretations, inclusively the current influential study by Louis Sass in The Paradoxes of 
Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind (Sass, 1995). Freudian theory is highly 
complex and has developed into several different schools. According to Freudians Nacht and 
Racamier (Nacht, 1971, pp. 80-188) schizophrenics, while denying the common sense reality, do not 
bear the feeling of loneliness, so they create an alternative reality as an attempt to self-heal.  The 
French psychoanalyst Jaccques Lacan (see Vanheule, 2011) elaborated a different theory that has had 
great influence (inclusive in Deleuze). His starting point is schizophrenic verbal discourse. This 
discourse is not used to communicate anymore; one can say that the schizophrenic is out of discourse 
and consequently out of the social link.   
Another line of thought that, along with Psychoanalysis, has had a great influence is 
Phenomenology. These two Schools have in common the emphasis placed on the subject and the 
wealth of personal history. Jaspers introduced phenomenology in Psychiatry taking inspiration from 
Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J. Pereira, J. G. (eds.) (2018). Schizophrenia and Common Sense: explaining the relation 
between madness and social values. Springer International Publishing. Studies in Brain and Mind. Vol 12. 
Husserl, although according to some authors his main influence was the Kantian theory of knowledge 
(Chung, 2007). His work General Psychopathology (1913) is, still today, a major reference in 
Psychopathology. He distinguished the empathic understanding of patients from the objective 
description of their symptoms. Concerning schizophrenia, Jaspers thought that it was not susceptible 
of understanding, only of causal explanation. Psychiatric phenomenologists who followed him were 
less pessimistic and tried to understand schizophrenia, rather than only researching its neuronal 
correlations. Tatossian (2002) considered that phenomenology, as Jaspers understood it, was only a 
method of data collection and it was different from phenomenological psychiatry, which began 
properly in 1922 with Minkowski (1864-1909) and Binswanger (1881-1966). Minkowski was not a 
direct disciple of Husserl or Heidegger, but his analysis of psychiatric patients does bring him closer 
to phenomenology (see Sass 2001). Influenced by the Bergsonian distinction between intellect and 
intuition, Minkowski holds that there are two layers of the self. One registers and replies to external 
stimulus and the other, which is deeper, is the place of feelings and experience. In schizophrenia, 
there is a split between these two parts. There is a loss of vital contact with reality and an 
exaggeration of the intellectual and spatial sides. This leads to a continuous interrogative attitude and 
rigidly abstract thought. Minkowski had a great influence on authors from several countries such as 
Blankenburg, Kimura, Tellenbach, Tatossian, Lacan, Rollo May, and R. D. Laing among others. 
However, Binswanger sustained that he was still too much of a “psychologist” (Chung, 2007) and that 
solely with Heidegger’s work does one begin to have really intellectual instruments for an analysis of 
human existence. He called his method Daseinanalysis, receiving influences from Husserl, Freud and 
Heidegger. In one of his works directly concerning schizophrenia (Binswanger, 1956), he holds that 
schizophrenia can be described in three modes of existential failure: extravagance, perverseness, and 
mannerist behaviour. 
Along the same lines, Blankenburg (1928-2002) develops the concept of “natural evidence” and of its 
loss in schizophrenia (Sass, 2001). Schizophrenics lose common sense, meaning the capacity to see 
what is obvious as obvious, in a process that can remind us of a philosophical attitude (as 
Wittgenstein also pointed out in his work). One main difference between the two is that, while 
philosophy is a deliberate, theoretical, and experimental position, a schizophrenic cannot avoid his 
own state, becoming, in this way, isolated from others and society. Another phenomenological 
psychopathologist, Kimura Bin (b. 1931), considered that schizophrenia is a self-disorder. The patient 
does not feel himself to be the owner of his representations and he resists being absorbed by others, 
that is to say, by the “pure and absolute otherness” (Sass, 2001, p. 265), and losing his personal 
identity. 
As we can see, these psychiatrists abandoned the epistemological pessimism of Jaspers and 
endeavoured to succeed in interpreting schizophrenia, at least partially. In the 1960s and 1970s, a 
critical movement regarding institutional psychiatry emerged. It was known as “antipsychiatry”, 
although not all proponents of the new approach accepted that label. The so called “antipsychiatrics” 
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were clearly influenced by phenomenology and psychoanalysis. From this approach, we will focus on 
R. D. Laing, a Scottish psychiatrist who, influenced by Minkowski's ideas, attempted to reconcile 
existential philosophy with the British School of psychoanalysis (especially Bion and Winnicott). He 
also defined schizophrenia in terms of a self-disorder, as a “divided self” (Laing, 1960). His basic 
concept is “ontological insecurity”, highlighting the distress of the schizophrenic experience. 
Phenomenologists and also antipsychiatrists have been very influential regarding today’s 
interpretation of schizophrenia as a self-disorder. Sass, Parnas and others (Sass, Parnas and Zahavi, 
2011) uncovered that which is now common to several sets of symptoms grouped as “schizophrenia”. 
These symptoms become more understandable and explainable if one sees this as a radical disorder in 
the sense of self. Sass (1995) applied Wittgenstein’s analysis of solipsism to schizophrenia. The 
patient is not, obviously, a solipsist but a quasi-solipsist (Sass, 1995) in the sense that several 
symptoms become intelligible if one understands that he himself feels as if only he and nobody else 
exists in the world. More recently, Sass presented a model (see for example, Sass and Byrom, 2015) 
in which the core of schizophrenia is a disorder of the minimal self, or ipseity, meaning the crucial 
sense of existing in each moment or the vital centre of subjectivity. This self-disorder is identified by 
three basic characteristics: hyperreflexivity, where processes which normally are in the background 
become vividly focalized by consciousness; diminished self-presence, meaning a decline in the sense 
of existing and being an agent; a disturbed grip or hold that results from the other two characteristics 
and is a confusion in spatiotemporal structure and in the distinction between perceiving, memorizing, 
and imagining. Sass also elaborates on the relation of these three aspects providing not only a 
description of schizophrenia but also advancing forward to the level of explanation (Sass 2010). 
Stanghellini (2000), taking up Kant’s position (2006, p. 113) that "the only universal characteristic of 
madness is the loss of common sense (sensus communis) and its replacement with logical private 
sense (sensus privatus)" and continuing the ideas of the phenomenologists (with the concepts of 
“natural evidence”, “natural attitude” and others) and antipsychiatrists (who provided evidence 
regarding the concept of “social normality”), stresses the importance of the concept of common sense 
in understanding schizophrenia. He thinks common sense is an adaptive instrument that the members 
of a given community share and that allows them to discern relations of physical causality and social 
motivation in the subject’s context. The loss of common sense becomes evident in a lack of intuitive 
attunement and in a failure of practical capacities necessary to an everyday integration in a social 
context (Stanghellini, 2000, p. 783). 
Related with this theme of common sense, Sass (1992) holds that there is a parallelism 
between schizophrenia and modernism, the latter having a main tendency to go against what is 
culturally established. Modern art aims to shock social consciousness. An example is Antonin Artaud 
(Sass, 1996), whose work was very influential in the areas of contemporary theatre, cinema, and 
poetry, and who was diagnosed as schizophrenic. According to Sass, Artaud described his altered 
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states of consciousness, revealing a poetic dimension in schizophrenia. The existential angst present in 
schizophrenia is a paradigm of several modern art works.  
The lines of thought that we have briefly outlined to this point are mainly centred on the 
analysis of subjectivity. In a different line, there are approaches that focus more on a third person 
perspective, looking for identification of typical symptoms, discovering neuronal correlations of these 
symptoms and prescribing chemical treatments. Psychopharmacology has gained prominence since 
1952 with the discovery of neuroleptics. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) has reflected this evolution since its third version, which radically changed its orientation. It is 
only a diagnostic manual, but it created a new paradigm in Psychiatry that funded the psychiatric 
taxonomy; this is in line with Hempel’s logical empiricism (1966), including only descriptions of 
symptoms and syndromes, in opposition to a theoretical approach (Chung, 2007). In order to be as 
consensual as possible, any explainable theory should prevail over others. The diagnostic criteria were 
initially chosen in accordance with the principles of the Saint-Louis school (see Feighner et al, 1972). 
Nevertheless, some criticisms have emerged about this orientation of the DSM. From a scientific 
point of view, its categories would be unclear and would not allow for a reduction of clinical 
uncertainty (Poland, 2006). Furthermore, it is not as atheoretical as might be thought. As a matter of 
fact, DSM is very permeable to cultural factors, specifically reflecting American culture (Garrabé, 
2003), and a mixture of theories (Ghaemi, 2012). It has also been stated that the DSM created too 
many symptoms and it has benefitted psychopharmacology (and the pharmaceutical industry) to the 
detriment of other forms of approach to mental disorder. Another aspect is that the use of DSM could 
lead to a neglect of personal history in favour of a search for typical symptoms, becoming somehow 
dehumanizing (Allen, 2015). In spite of these criticisms, the DSM continues to be the most widely 
used diagnostic manual, especially due to its capacity to unify psychiatric language, or so we think. In 
relation to schizophrenia, in the DSM the theories also disappear, giving place only to consensual 
knowledge. Thus, Bleuler´s terms such as Spaltung, autism, and ambivalence are no longer part of the 
diagnostic criteria. On the other hand, the meaning of “schizophrenia” is more restricted in the DSM 
than it is in American psychiatry, becoming limited to a specific syndrome. In the latest version, the 
DSM 5, schizophrenia is included in “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorders.” 
As mentioned above, the concept of “schizophrenia” as an illness is still today a topic of debate 
among authors who claim that Schizophrenia does not correspond to any coherent diagnosis (Berrios 
et al, 2003). However, one knows that the symptoms are real and are related with the distress of the 
patients or with their social maladaptation (Chung, 2007). This is why, recently, some authors prefer 
to focus on the symptoms themselves, leaving open whether “schizophrenia” is really a syndrome and 
its respective explanation. To explain the thought-insertion symptom, for instance, researchers focus 
on the agency of the self: Stephans & Graham (1994) concentrate on the experience of patients, while 
others look for cognitivist explanations (Frith, 1992). Delusions in general, not only associated with 
schizophrenia, have also been investigated (including in this volume) from a cognitive perspective 
Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J. Pereira, J. G. (eds.) (2018). Schizophrenia and Common Sense: explaining the relation 
between madness and social values. Springer International Publishing. Studies in Brain and Mind. Vol 12. 
(Bortolloti, 2010), combining cognitivism with neurophysiology (Spitzer & Casas, 1997) and 
phenome-nology (Gallagher, 2009). 
In the last two decades, advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiological and neuropathological 
approaches have enabled us to find several neurobiological correlations with the symptoms of 
schizophrenia. Alterations at the level of the genes, the size of the brain ventricles, and neuronal 
activity were associated with schizophrenia. However, it was not yet possible to establish the 
"biological markers" (biological indicators of the disease, which may or may not be causal). Ford 
(2017) investigated the obstacles that have been confronted during the research into neurobiological 
bases and proposed some solutions to overcome them. These obstacles are, according to the authors, 
samples that are too small, questionable reliability and validity of measurements, medication 
confounds, failure to distinguish state and trait effects, correlation–causation ambiguity, and the 
absence of compelling animal models of specific symptoms to test mechanistic hypotheses derived 
from brain-symptom correlations. At present, several researchers hope that these obstacles will be 
overcome and that schizophrenia can be definitively reconceptualized as a brain disease rather than a 
psychological condition caused by the relationship with the social environment, especially family. 
Nevertheless, authors such as Fuchs (2011) argue that one should not start from a one-way causality, 
as if the brain were the creator of experience. Actually, the brain is a mediating organ between the 
mind and the environment. Experiences also imprint their mark on the brain yet a reductionist model 
denies this. For his part, Gerrans (2014) maintains that there are several explanatory levels, and 
although the neurobiological level is the last of the chain, it does not make sense to talk about 
schizophrenia, or about another mental disorder, without reference to personal and mental levels. 
 
Towards Interdisciplinarity  
 
Despite the vast amount of literature and research, it seems that the study of schizophrenia 
and of the psychoses is suffering from a generic disintegration.  As shown within the historical 
overview, there are a variety of theories and approaches to schizophrenia. One of the few unifying 
themes is that schizophrenia is considered, by many, the prototypical disturbance for the study of both 
the ill and the healthy mind (e.g. Parnas, 2012). Regarding Schizophrenia, ICD-8 states that it is “the 
fundamental disturbance of personality, involves its most basic functions, those that give the normal 
person his feeling of individuality, uniqueness, and self-direction”. As a concept and as a 
phenomenon, it has generated interest for many years and within several study areas. Ranging from 
film, the arts and religion, to philosophy, psychology, psychiatry and molecular biology, is has been 
argued and debated from several different perspectives and points of view. Despite the vast amount of 
information and knowledge gathered in the field of schizophrenia, clinical practice is still poor and 
ineffective in many cases, whether at pharmacological, psychological or social level. If, on the one 
hand, biological psychiatry and empirical psychology are looking for biological and behavioural 
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markers, psychoanalysis or other relational psychotherapeutic approaches are more concerned with 
“ways-of-being-with” others (Stern, 2003) and how these were internalized during infancy and then 
generalized during adolescence and adulthood. From the point of view of clinicians, philosophical 
studies and argumentation are sometimes presented with little or no connection to clinical practice 
resembling, at times, the very process of psychotic delusion (i.e. no empirical data is used to back up 
or validate subjective arguments). Looking at schizophrenia at the conceptual and phenomenological 
levels (e.g. Hipólito & Martins; Lalumera; Boncompagni; Thoma & Fuchs; Bizzari; in this volume) 
can be of extreme value to free our minds from clinical pre-conceptions, personal assumptions or 
social constructions. A “free” mind is a mind that is able to think creatively about a problem, and 
possibly get closer to finding solutions or insightful answers. However, one should also note, if little 
or no connection to “reality” is left, one is unable to use such knowledge for the benefit of people 
diag-nosed with schizophrenia, their families, teachers or even politicians. Even the debate about 
whether schizophrenia is an illness or not would lose common sense if no connection to people’s lives 
was made. 
A number of authors in this volume (e.g. Pereira & Debanné; Hipólito & Martins) attempt an 
integrative view where training, practice, theory and research are considered as parts of a larger 
whole. These chapters lack, however, the conceptual debate of other chapters (e.g. Gonçalves; Thoma 
& Fuchs; Sass; in this volume). This is a varied and pluralistic volume, and it is up to the reader to 
make use of different chapters according to his or her own needs. 
Historically, it is possible to find good examples of integration in the work on psychosis. For 
example, the Society of Psychological and Social Approaches to Psychosis (ISPS) has, for around 40 
years, presented integrative accounts of research, theory and practice, showing how good results can 
be achieved if enough time and dedication is given to people diagnosed with schizophrenia and to 
their families. The examples of Soteria (Mosher, 2004) or Open Dialogue (Seikkula et al, 2006) are 
also testimony that psychosis and schizophrenia are not life sentences or irreversible chronic illnesses. 
It is, rather, the “dis-ease” presented to families and to society in general that dictates the failure of 
most current approaches to psychosis. The urge for (only) quantitative measuring, Randomized 
Controlled Trials (RCTs) and other “gold-standard” research methods is only favouring “large 
enterprises” that promote quick fixes, such as the pharmacological industry, hospital beds or generic 
clinical management. Specialist interventions such as the examples mentioned above are expensive 
(although money-saving in the long-term) and take time (usually no less than five years). Such invest-
ments are usually difficult political decisions, since they overrun the lifetime of democratic 
governments and do not deliver results in the short-term. But how dissembling can we continue to be, 
whilst knowing the possible answers but repeatedly investing in failure and repetition? We hope that, 
in this volume, the reader is able to start reflecting more deeply on the problem of psychosis, 
schizophrenia, and common sense, enabling them to innovate, rather than to repeat, and to collaborate, 
rather than to compete. 
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The overview of the book 
 
Part 1: Phenomenological approaches 
 
 
Samuel Thoma and Thomas Fuchs, in their chapter, Inhabiting the shared world: Phenomenological 
considerations on sensus communis, social space and schizophrenia, draw phenomenological 
considerations on sensus communis, social space and schizophrenia. Thoma and Fuchs point out that 
due to the increasingly intersubjective focus of psychopathology, common sense has become one of 
the most important research topics in contemporary phenomenological psychiatry. In their article, 
they firstly develop a tripartite concept of sensus communis in order to describe the fundamentally 
social nature of human experience, ranging from sensory, intercorporeal and cognitive capacities that 
are acquired in social interactions. To give a concrete example of their theory, they then look at sensus 
communis under the aspect of spatiality, i.e. as a means of inhabiting different domains of social 
space, such as inti-mate, private, communal, public, and also virtual space. They combine their 
reflections with considerations on schizophrenic experience, offering the reader a discussion on 
therapeutic consequences. 
In Chapter 3, following the same phenomenological line, Schizophrenia and Common Sense: 
A Phenomenological Perspective, Valeria Bizzarri focuses on the role of the body, arguing for the 
existence of an embodied Self that is necessary for our “being-in-the-world” and for our common 
sense. Her hypothesis is that our lived body is the main instrument for the organization of experience, 
intersubjective interaction and our understanding of the world. The contribution of such a view is 
twofold: on the one hand, it exposes the central role of corporeity in the understanding of self, 
otherness and objective reality as it emerges from the analysis of psychopathological disturbances; on 
the other hand, it shows that a phenomenological perspective could be helpful not just in the 
understanding, but also in the treatment of similar pathologies. 
That is what Inês Hipólito and Jorge Martins, in A second-person model to anomalous social 
cognition, (Chapter 4) propose by asking how anomalous experience can be investigated both from 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints. The chapter claims that qualities of perception and 
kinaesthetic phenomena are central features when considering human experience in general, and 
anomalous social cognition in particular. Hipólito and Martins thus attempt to bring forward what 
they call a second-person scientific design, accounting for both the first-person enactive experience, 
and respective third-person neurobiological correlates. From this proposal, they further explore the 
consequences for clinical and research practice. 
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Part 2. The self-disturbance hypothesis 
 
In Chapter 5, "Negative Symptoms," Commonsense, and Cultural Disembedding in the Modern Age, 
Louis Sass offers a cutting-edge interpretation of the so-called “negative symptoms” of schizophrenia, 
considering these symptoms in relation to key aspects of modern culture and consciousness. Sass 
evidences how many “negative-symptom” experiences in schizophrenia comprise forms of 
subjectivity characterized by hyperreflexivity and alienation. The exacerbation of various kinds of 
self-consciousness, often involves disengagement from the grounding frameworks, assumptions, and 
bodily dispositions that would normally serve as the taken-for-granted background of practical action 
and experience. Sass points out how modern society might contribute to, or at least exacerbate, certain 
characteristics of schizophrenia. The person with schizophrenia seems an anomalous yet also an 
exemplary figure: a person who fails to adopt the social practices or internalize the cultural 
frameworks essential to normal existence, yet who, in this very failure, typifies some of the most 
distinctive features of the modern age. 
In Chapter 6, Klaus Gartner focuses on Conscious Experience and Experience Externalization 
(Chapter 6). Gartner notes that the main characteristic of conscious experience is its phenomenology, 
and that recent interpretations claim that the phenomenal character involves two kinds of features: 
qualitative and subjective. Some think that the latter is the essential feature in phenomenal 
consciousness. This goes hand in hand with the neo-phenomenologist claim that conscious experience 
necessarily involves a form of pre-reflective self-consciousness. Gartner defends a naturalized view of 
conscious experience that straightforwardly fits Sass & Parnas's interpretation of schizophrenia. 
 Clowes’ ground-breaking paper, The Ipseity Disturbance Theory of Schizophrenia and 
Predictive Processing, in chapter 7, takes a new look at the ipseity distortion hypothesis (IDH) to 
schizophrenia. He argues that while the IDH provides a powerful attempt to characterize prodromal 
schizophrenia it needs to be constrained and sharpened by an encounter with the best current 
mechanistic theories of psychopathology. After offering a detailed discussion and critique of the 
explanatory concepts of ipseity theory, Clowes shows how they can be grounded in the recent 
theoretical approach of Hierarchical Predictive Processing (HPP) (Clark, 2015). Especially, Clowes 
shows how the phenomenology of prodromal schizophrenia can be explained in terms of HPP theories 
of presence (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011), how the brain´s persistent problem of explaining away 
disturbed presence is naturally linked to a theory of emergent hyperreflexivity, and how, because of 
the tight links between belief and perception on HPP models, the development of delusion can also be 
explained. Clowes argues ipseity theory is much deepened by this encounter with HPP and new lines 
of empirical investigation are suggested. 
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George Carpenter’s  Mind as Madness: Louis Sass and the horizonal concept of experience, 
chapter 8, focuses on the Husserlian horizonal conception of experience, which in Valberg’s 
perspective, presupposes direct realism, and offers the only mean-ingful explication of knowledge and 
consciousness. Nevertheless, he effectively concedes that these latter are dependent upon the proper 
functioning of the brain and nervous system. Changes in brain functions supported by experience 
would have effects not only phenomenologically, but would be epistemologically indistinguishable 
from changes to the external world itself. Carpenter points out that Louis Sass finds strikingly similar 
paradoxes in the experiences of schizophrenic patients. Carpenter, hence, investigates the parallels 
between what Valberg thinks is our common-sensical human condition, and what Sass regards as 
psychopathology. He asks whether Valberg's position is really indicative of the psychological traits 
Sass analyses. Ultimately, Carpenter appears to conclude that the question is whether physicalism can 
be rendered free of contradiction, or without appeal to psychological explanations for competing 
metaphysical positions. 
 
 
Part 3. Emotions and Delusions  
 
 
Dina Mendonça, in Chapter 9, asks what Can Schizophrenia Teach Us About Emotions? The chapter 
remarkably argues that the contradiction of emotional experiences identified in schizophrenia is a 
normal part of emotional life. Building on Ratcliffe's idea of thinking of schizophrenia in relational 
terms and taking up the claim that the minimal self reflects a fundamental orientation to the world and 
the social world, this enables us to consider schizophrenic emotional life as a way to offer insights 
about emotional life. Mendonça endeavours to show how the visibility of contradiction seen in 
schizophrenia patients brings to the surface some aspects of the complexity of emotional life and 
offers insights into some of the processing of emotional experiences. Consequently, taking the 
contradiction of emotional experience in schizophrenia as familiar instead of strange shows that 
emotional life entails experiences where there is an inconsistency between first order emotions, 
moods and the emotional episode as well as experiences of conflict between first order emotions and 
meta-emotions. Accepting that the emotional processing is similar, although the outcomes are 
different for schizophrenia patients, raises novel questions about the difficulty for patients and 
caregivers to share and mutually understand emotional experience.  
Jorge Gonçalves, in Chapter 10, Why are delusions pathological?, aims to identify a characteristic of 
delusions: what makes them pathological? It may appear at first a bit strange because one believes 
that delusions are just a pathological alteration of the mind. However, Gonçalves will positively point 
out how some authors show that although pathological delusions are the most studied, not all 
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delusions have necessarily harmful consequences for the delirious subject or for others. Hence it 
seems pertinent to question what makes delusions a pathological state.  
Jose Eduardo Porcher, in Chapter 11, The doxastic status of delusion and the limits of folk 
psychology, follows the same line, however focusing mainly on clinical delusions and doxasticism, 
further presenting the main alternative characterizations that have emerged in its wake. He questions 
the validity of the debate between doxasticists and non-doxasticists by stepping back and assessing 
the meaning and relevance of the question ‘are delusions beliefs?’ He argues that, by focusing on 
what appears to be a merely terminological dispute, the theorists engaged in this debate have lost sight 
of two desirable features of a precise characterization of delusions, namely, its use in the development 
of a scientiﬁc theory of the relevant phenomena and, finally, its ability to account for the experience 
of the patients. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 4:  Therapeutic and clinical methods 
  
 
João G. Pereira and Martin Debbané, in Chapter 12, An integrative-relational approach in 
Schizophrenia: from philosophical principles to mentalization-based practice, discuss mentalizing in 
training, practice and supervision. This chapter remarkably explains how Mentalizing, par excellence, 
a relational concept, can be usefully applied in clinical practice when understood contextually within 
the history of psychological therapies. In the final sections, the chapter explores psychosis and 
schizophrenia as prototypical disturbances, where mentalizing failures are widely seen. They further 
attempt to describe how the process of rekindling mentalizing within attachment relationships (here, 
the patient-therapist relationship) can have a protective effect not just at the onset of the disturbance, 
but also when psychosis is already actively installed.      
Adam Timlett, in Chapter 13, asks Is a therapy for fostering common sense possible?, and devises a 
useful approach to the study of common sense by considering a model of knowledge-gathering. This 
offers the possibility of therapeutic interventions for individuals who appear to engage in highly 
unreliable knowledge-gathering. The requirements of such a model are the drawing up of the concept 
of ‘personal epistemologies’ that vary in the population, leading away from, or to, common sense 
knowledge and praxis. It is argued that education theory and science can inform and fulfil these broad 
requirements, specifically the theory and science based on Piaget’s constructivism and Vygotsky’s 
social constructivism, by providing a normative standard for knowledge-gathering praxis. Interesting 
and significant parallels are found with phenomenological theories of schizophrenia, which 
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investigate the loss of common sense. These parallels emphasise common ground between these 
different domains of research and can provide a starting point for enriching existing therapeutic 
models for certain targeted groups. 
: 
 
 
 
Part 5: Wittgensteinean outlook 
 
 
Anna Boncomplagni, in Chapter 14, Common Sense, Philosophy, and Mental Disturb-ance:  A 
Wittgensteinian Outlook, examines an interesting focus on common sense, philosophy, and mental 
disturbance, from a Wittgensteinian Outlook. Boncompagni asks why Wittgenstein likens philosophy 
both to an illness and to a therapy. What kind of relationship is there between these two sides of 
philosophy? The chapter answers these questions by focusing on common sense, which plays a key 
role in the dialectic between illness and therapy, and by comparing Wittgenstein’s outlook to some 
studies in psychopathology. After introducing the issue of radical doubt as a manifestation of 
philosophical disease, Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinges’ is explained in terms of common sense 
certainties. Building on prior literature in psychopathology and philosophy of psychiatry, the author 
argues that doubts regarding ‘hinges’ can indeed characterize the early stages of schizophrenia. If this 
sheds lights on the insane side of philosophy, its therapeutic side finds its task in the rediscovery and 
strengthening of practical trust, a task that the author describes as one of ‘de-epistemicization’ of life. 
 In the same line, Elisabetta Lalumera, in Chapter 15, Understanding schizophrenia through 
Wittgenstein: empathy, explanation, and philosophical illustration, encouragingly considers two 
different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts: (1) Campbell's idea that delusions involve a mechanism 
of which different framework propositions are parts, and (2) Sass' proposal that the schizophrenic 
patient can be described as a solipsist; and a “negative” wittgensteinian account, in which epistemic 
aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. Lalumera 
shows that none of these wittgensteinian accounts succeed in empathic-phenomenological 
understanding, contrary to a widespread reading. Rather, they provide examples of how philosophical 
concepts can contribute to model-building explanation, and to philosophical clarification, 
respectively. 
 We hope this overview gave a satisfactory explanation of the interdisciplinarity effort at hand 
in this volume, towards the difficult understanding of plurality ⎯ and the fragmentations ⎯ of the self, 
or of the soul. As in Pessoa’s words, 
I don’t know how many souls I have. 
I’ve changed at every moment. 
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I always feel like a stranger. 
I’ve never seen or found myself. 
From being so much, I have only soul. 
A man who has soul has no calm. 
A man who sees is just what he sees. 
A man who feels is not who he is. 
  
We hope that the interdisciplinary work described in this volume stimulates researchers and clinicians 
to reflect on our ability and responsibility to build a twenty-first century conception of schizophrenia 
that is embedded on social practices and cultural values. 
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